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This discussion of catastrophes is designed to provide a better 
understanding of their impact on the property insurance mechanism. The 
discussion includes an overview of recent major catastrophes which have 
struck the United States. Along with a discussion of the devastating losses 
sustained by insurers, the various ways in which the industry has 
responded are explored. Finally, suggestions on how insurers may cope 
with catastrophes in the future are given. 
In the United States, four of the five most severe individual 
catastrophes from 1950 to 1992 occurred in 1989 or later. These four 
events include Hurricane Hugo (1989), the Oakland Fire (1991), Hurricane 
Andrew (1992), and Hurricane Iniki (1992) ("Impact" 5). The severity of the 
California earthquake in January 1994 is mounting as losses are being 
reestimated from earlier predictions. Prior to 1994, hurricanes had the 
greatest impact on homeowners insurance ("Impact" 10). Earthquakes, as 
seen by the California earthquake just a few months ago, are few in 
number but devastating in terms of losses. 
In 19H2 Hurricane Andrew accounted for the bulk of all losses, 
totaling $16 billion (Ferraiolo 11). Within three hours after the storm hit, 
preliminary dlata estimated losses to be $10.7 billion with $15.6 billion being 
the worst-case scenario. Other estimates given were off-the-mark. One 
initial estimate was $7.8 billion. Prudential Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company originally estimated losses at $136 million, but 
incurred $1.1 billion in pretax losses after reinsurance. Other companies 
saw final losses five times their initial estimates (Noonan 41). The reasons 
for under-estimating Hurricane Andrew's losses vary. Building costs in 
south Florida rose tremendously and builders drove prices up as much as 
50 percent (Noonan 42). Knowing how many claims to expect was not the 
problem. Knowing how much the amount of each claim was going to rise 
became the question. 
The sudden demand for building materials after Hurricane Andrew 
caught suppliers off-guard. Roofing shingles were imported to Florida from 
as far away as west of the Mississippi River. Shortages also meant long 
waits for repairs. Six months after the hurricane struck, about three-
quarters of severely damaged homes had yet to be repaired. Immediately 
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after the storm, the materials used to temporarily protect those homes 
were scarce. The continued rains soaked the area. Those exposed 
homes went unprotected, and the losses went from partial to sometimes 
total (Noonan 42). 
Compliance with building codes also became a factor in figuring 
insurers' losses. After Hurricane Andrew hit, lawsuits and allegations came 
accusing contractors of skimping on materials and violating Florida building 
codes. The structures were said to be unsuitable for withstanding such a 
hurricane. Dean Flesner, a vice president of State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company, estimates that 25 percent of the losses from Hurricane Andrew 
can be blamed on poor compliance with building codes, though he 
stresses that any figure is only guesswork. Other experts have speculated 
that the poor building codes can be blamed for 20 to 40 percent of the 
losses (Noonan 42). 
One feature that appeared to distinguish partial from total losses was 
the presence of "hurricane straps" that hold the roofs of houses in place. 
According to Len Guarini, vice president of the actuarial department at 
PRUPAC, a house's roof is its most critical "seal" against wind and rain. In 
one development, model homes with hurricane straps withstood the 
hurricane well, while those without straps were destroyed. "Tens of 
thousands" of houses would have generated claims of only $25,000 to 
$50,000 had their roofs remained intact, says Mr. Flesner. Instead, the 
roofs blew away, causing total losses and payouts of $150,000 or more. 
He points to one study conducted for State Farm by an engineering firm on 
homes at the fringes of Hurricane Andrew, where winds are thought to 
have peaked at 120 mph. Roofing failures due to code violations were 
found in more than half of the homes studied (Noonan 42). 
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Wind damage turned out to be far greater in Hurricane Andrew than 
many experts had anticipated, according to Jack Weber, executive director 
of the Natural Disaster Coalition (formerly the Earthquake Project). 
Flooding is usually regarded as the worst threat. But Hurricane Andrew 
contained winds of unexpected speed. Wind, at sufficiently high velocities, 
tears down structures regardless of location and leaves total losses. 
Flooding, while still capable of catastrophic damage, is confined to low-
lying areas. When the waters recede, there may be salvageable structures 
still standing (Noonan 44). 
Whether a house was destroyed by Hurricane Andrew's ravishing 
winds or soaked by weeks of rain, many homes that lacked full-
replacement policies ultimately were treated as if they had this coverage, 
all in the name of politics and public relations, according to Karen Clark, 
president of Applied Insurance Research. For many months, companies 
continued to reopen files as losses worsened and costs escalated. Other 
factors that emerged as a result of Hurricane Andrew's devastation include 
fraudulent and inflated claims. These claims either got past overworked 
adjusters or were overlooked in an attempt at generosity. Public adjusters 
invaded Florida, whose profits depend on the size of the checks they write. 
Florida Insurance Commissioner Tom Gallagher eventually cracked down 
on those adjusters, some of whom were collecting commissions of 30 
percent on each settlement (Noonan 93). 
1992 saw $22 billion worth of catastrophes, according to N. David 
Thompson, president and chief executive officer of North American 
Reinsurance~ Corporation. Mr. Thompson claims that Hurricane Andrew 
was the sin!~le worst catastrophic loss in the property/casualty industry. 
Although the high estimate of losses due to Hurricane Andrew is at $16 
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- billion, had tile storm struck 20 or 30 miles farther north, damages could 
have reached $45 billion (Christine 60). 
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Catastrophe losses in 1992 equaled those incurred from 1981 to 
1990. During that time, losses caused by catastrophes totaled $22.5 
billion. In 19'92 Hurricane Andrew losses were the greatest, but Hurricane 
Iniki, the Los. Angeles riots, the Chicago flood, windstorms, hail, snow and 
tornadoes added another $6 billion. Even without the hurricane losses, 
1992 would have been the second most costly year on record 
(Ferraiolo 11). 
Before Hurricane Andrew devastated southern Florida, Hurricane 
Hugo had its way with South Carolina in 1989. Gross losses for Hurricane 
Hugo were $4.2 billion, more than ten times the premiums written for 
homeowners and commercial multiple peril insurance in South Carolina 
(Ferraiolo 111). Although the insured losses from Hurricane Andrew were 
more than three times as great as those from Hurricane Hugo, Hugo is the 
next most severe catastrophe. Hurricane Hugo caused more than twice 
the insured losses of the severest catastrophe before 1989 - Hurricane 
Betsy in 1965 ("Impact" 6). 
1993 proved to be a year of dramatic financial recovery for the 
property/casualty insurance industry. Yet, industry analysts warn that the 
recovery may be short-lived. 1994 is already showing signs of becoming 
one of the worst on record for catastrophes, possibly second only to 1992. 
According to Sean Mooney, senior vice president and economist for the 
New York-based Insurance Information Institute, claims from the January 
earthquake in Los Angeles are now expected to top $4 billion. Also, he 
noted that winter storm claims have already passed $1 billion and some 
analysts are estimating they will total $3 billion. Mr. Mooney states that 
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these early natural disasters could make 1994 the second or third worst 
year on record for catastrophes, and this is before the hail, tornado, and 
hurricane seasons (Jones 21). 
The big financial improvements posted by the property/casualty 
insurance business last year "must be kept in perspective," according to 
Peter Wade, an analyst with New York-based Standard and Poor's. The 
industry rebounded expectedly with a 628 percent growth in operating 
income to $13.2 billion (compared to a $2.5 billion loss in 1992), as well as 
a nearly 50 percent decline in underwriting losses to $18.7 billion (from $36 
billion in 1992). Net income after taxes for the property/casualty business 
totaled $185 billion last year, up 219 percent from the $5.8 billion figure for 
1992. WadE! added that this major improvement over the worst year in its 
history doesn't mean that the business is dOing well (Jones 21). 
California has been hit with no fewer than four catastrophes in less 
than five years. The disaster toll includes the 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake, the costliest earthquake in United States history, which caused 
$7 billion in damage in the San Francisco area, of which only $1 billion was 
insured. In 1991, insured losses from fires in Oakland totaled $1.7 billion. 
The 1992 riots in Los Angeles caused $775 million in insured losses, while 
the brush fires of Southern California in the fall of 1993 caused nearly $1 
billion in insured losses ("Preparing" 8). 
The earthquake that tore through the Los Angeles area on Monday, 
January 17, 1994, measured 6.6 on the Richter scale. The earthquake 
was followed by numerous aftershocks, several of which were greater than 
5.0 on the Hichter scale. The earthquake, which had its epicenter in the 
San Fernando Valley town of Northridge, crumbled freeways, collapsed 
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many buildings, and left thousands of structures uninhabitable. The 
earthquake kjlled 55 and injured about 7,000 people (Kertesz 1). 
Initial reports estimated insured losses from the California 
earthquake to be at least $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion (Kertesz 1). These 
figures would have made this earthquake the largest insured earthquake 
loss ever. \JVith some insurers substantially increasing their estimates of 
losses in the Los Angeles earthquake, it now appears likely that the overall 
insured loss will top $4 billion. The Property Claim Services Division of the 
American Insurance Services Group in Rahway, New Jersey, which 
originally estimated the insured loss at $2.5 billion, is resurveying over 100 
insurers and will soon revise its estimate to approximately $4 billion. It 
became clear the the original industry loss estimate was too low when 
Allstate increased its loss estimate from the January 17 earthquake from 
$350 million to $650 million. 20th Century Insurance Company more than 
doubled its loss estimate from $160 million to $325 million (Haggerty 23). 
The California earthquake insured losses might be thought of as 
taking a hard hit at property/casualty insurers. But experts tend to believe 
that the property/casualty market will survive this, just as it has survived 
the other catastrophes. Mooney says, "If Hurricane Andrew didn't do it, it's 
hardly likely that this would do it." "This industry has clearly shown that it 
can swallow this," said Alan Levin, senior vice president-insurance rating 
services of Standard and Poor's Corporation ("Record" 38). 
The earthquake may have minimal effects in narrow markets such 
as California earthquake coverage. California's earthquake market is 
dominat.ed by three companies - State Farm Group, Allstate Insurance 
Company, and Farmers Insurance Group - which together control almost 
half of the market. Other top earthquake insurers in California include -
. -
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Aetna (6.1 %), USM (4.5%), 20th Century (3.5%), SAFECO (3.3%), CSM 
(3.0%), Planet (2.4%), and TIG (2.3%) ("Recordll 38). 
Many victims of the Southern California earthquake may face 
staggering repair bills because they lack insurance that will pay for their 
homes. Policyholders will be able to claim fire damage under standard 
homeowner policies. But many residents won't be covered if their homes 
collapsed or had other structural damage due to the earthquake. Even 
those who bought special earthquake insurance may face steep bills, 
because ealrthquake policies typically require customers to cover five 
percent to ten percent of the damage. "I think there's quite a number of 
people who don't have the coverage," said Rock Jenkins, a spokesman for 
State Farm Insurance. "It's an expense a lot of people don't want to pay 
for." ("Saving" 2). The National Association of Independent Insurers 
estimates that 25 percent of all California homeowners have earthquake 
insurance. In San Fernando Valley, where the earthquake was centered, 
approximately 40 percent of homeowners have earthquake coverage 
("Record" 38). In California, earthquake coverage costs an average of 
$150 to $3013 annually on top of average homeowners' insurance rates of 
$500 to $600, according to Jeanne Salvatore, a spokeswoman for the 
Insurance Information Institute. For earthquake-prone areas, it can cost 
more. .Jenkins said that State Farm charged about $409 for earthquake 
insurance with a five percent deductible for a $300,000 home in the San 
Fernando Valley. The same policy, with a ten percent deductible, would 
cost $327 ("Saving" 2). Californians are required by law to be offered 
earthquake insurance when they purchase or renew homeowners or 
renters insurance, but they are not required to purchase it ("Record" 38) . 
Other than the substantial cost of buying earthquake coverage, 
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- homeowners may not purchase it because they assumed the U.S. 
government would provide low-cost loans or grants after such a disaster 
("Saving" 2). 
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Neither of the stricken area's two largest insurers - State Farm and 
Allstate - is reinsured for earthquake losses. State Farm had received 
35,000 claims, primarily homeowners' claims, in just the first few days after 
the earthquake. After the San Francisco earthquake, State Farm received 
a total of jllst 31,000 claims. State Farm was planning to add 500 
adjusters and 100 claims management professionals from across the 
country to the 100 adjusters already on-site. Allstate, which says 
earthquake reinsurance is too expensive to buy, had received 12,086 
claims in just four days following the Los Angeles earthquake. Allstate had 
300 adjusters on-site with additional retired adjusters on-call ("Record" 38). 
Farmers Insurance Group received 14,000 loss reports by the fourth 
day foliowin~J the earthquake. Of its 400,000 homeowners policies in the 
Los Angeles area, about one-third include earthquake coverage. Farmers 
does not buy catastrophe reinsurance, but does have a risk excess 
reinsurance program for high-valued buildings that covers $28 million in 
excess of $~~ million. There is a $56 million aggregate per occurrence on 
the risk excess policy ("Record" 38). 
Reinsurance is an integral part of most insurance companies' 
catastrophe programs. Without protection from catastrophes, companies 
subject themselves to possible financial strain or insolvency. The 
reinsurance agreement may be on an excess of loss basis. With an 
excess of loss arrangement, the insurance company assumes a certain 
amount of loss as a retention. Losses above the retention are covered by 
the catastrophe treaty. 
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Some insurers depend solely on their reinsurance arrangements to 
protect them from catastrophic losses. While depending solely upon 
reinsurance agreements may relieve the insurer of some duties, there is 
always a danger that this protection will prove to be inadequate when the 
catastrophic event occurs. There is also the question of the financial ability 
of reinsurers to respond in the event of a massive catastrophe. There is 
also the question of availability and cost of future reinsurance should the 
reinsurer be! responsible for an extremely large loss arising from a 
concentration of writings. Therefore, many companies choose to limit their 
concentrations of liability and total amount exposed to certain catastrophe 
perils. Most commonly such catastrophe control plans deal with exposure 
to hurricane and earthquake losses, although individual insurers may feel 
the need to devise other programs to meet their specific needs 
(Hollingsworth 125). 
Catastrophe exposures vary widely from one geographic area to 
another. Hurricane losses are common along the Gulf Coast and the south 
Atlantic coast. Earthquake losses tend to be concentrated around certain 
geologic: faults. When a primary insurer decides to have a catastrophe 
reinsurance program, the geographic distribution of its insured properties 
must be carefully analyzed. The analysis should consider the numbers of 
properties that could be damaged in a single occurrence and the maximum 
aggregate amount of damage from such an occurrence (Harrison 52). 
Reinsurers have also been affected by the recent catastrophes. 
Following 19'92's catastrophes, reinsurers experienced huge losses. As a 
result of these losses, reinsurers reduced their exposure in the overly 
concentrated catastrophe-prone areas. These areas are also where 
reinsurance is most in demand. Problems in obtaining catastrophe 
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reinsurance were a major factor in limiting new earthquake writings. 
Earthquake insurance capacity in California was down nearly 20 percent 
("Impact" 16). 
Following 1992's catastrophes, prices for reinsurance and retentions 
by primary insurers increased substantially. Rates for available 
catastrophe reinsurance rose between 20 and 250 percent, depending on 
the ceding insurer's exposures, loss history, and ceded coverage layers. 
In 1992, U.S. insurers provided approximately $10 billion in catastrophe 
coverage. They bought a total of $8 billion in catastrophe reinsurance 
coverage above the $2 billion in coverage they retained. If U.S. insurers 
purchase catastrophe reinsurance coverage in amounts similar to 1992's, 
overall retentions could rise to $4 billion ("Impact" 16). 
Reinsurers have also imposed stricter policy terms. Some 
reinsurers have eliminated limits reinstatements for losses from a 
catastrophe extending over many days. Reinsurers may have added 
occurrence limits on certain property coverages, where none were 
previously imposed, to cap exposure to future catastrophes. Reinsurers 
have imposed stricter terms in an effort to recover from the catastrophes' 
drain on their surplus. Severe catastrophe losses can bring cash flow 
problems to some reinsurers, which might then delay or refuse payments 
to the cedin9 insurers ("Impact" 16). 
Reinsurance is not limited to the United States. Lloyd's of London 
was formerly one of the largest reinsurers of American risks. The number 
of individual investors, or names, declined from 33,000 in 1989 to 19,000 in 
1992. Lloyd's capacity fell more than 50 percent to $11.8 billion. The 
London company market for catastrophe business, which numbered about 
120 companies five years ago, is down to only 20 companies. In the 
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United States, the number of reinsurers has dropped over the last ten 
years from '129 to 54. Twenty of these reinsurers may be up for sale 
("Impact" 17). 
The capacity of the reinsurance market is small, compared to the 
potential loss from a $50 billion catastrophe. The amount of reinsurance 
that may be available worldwide in the event of a major catastrophe in the 
U.S. is difficult to determine. In 1992, the total net premiums written in the 
U.S. reinsurance market were $13.9 billion. Surplus amounted to $16.4 
billion. This is approximately the amount estimated for Hurricane Andrew's 
losses. The 1992 surplus-to-premium ratio was 1.18 for U.S. reinsurers 
("Impact" 17). 
In 19B1, total reinsurance premium ceded to overseas reinsurers 
was approximately $11.5 billion. Not all of the combined domestic and 
overseas reil1surance premiums cover catastrophic property risks. Only an 
estimated $8 billion in catastrophe reinsurance was available in 1992. 
Given that reinsurers' corresponding surplus was double this amount 
(making the ratio of surplus to premium much higher than that for U.S. 
reinsurers alone - 1.18 in 1992), it would be far short of $50 billion. $50 
billion is the possible size of insured losses from a major catastrophe 
("Impact" 17). 
At the end of 1992, A.M. Best estimated that amounts recoverable 
from all reinsurance represented slightly less than 45 percent of the 
estimated loss from Hurricane Andrew. A comparable percentage of a $50 
billion catastrophe would exceed the available reinsurance surplus. These 
figures indicate that the combined resources of domestic and overseas 
reinsurers would be far from sufficient to cover a $50 billion catastrophe 
("Impact" 17). 
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Reinsurers do agree that the Los Angeles earthquake will not 
develop into a major reinsurance loss. One reason is that estimates of 
insured losses are far less than those from Hurricane Andrew in 1992. 
Some Lloyd's of London catastrophe underwriters say that $3.5 billion is 
the minimum loss that would trigger excess of loss reinsurance claims from 
major U.S. (~ding companies into the London market. Another reason 
reinsurers expect only small losses is that catastrophe rates have been 
high in recent years, and those higher rates have prompted ceding 
companies to retain more losses. The earthquake may increase demand 
for catastrophe coverage from Bermuda, London, and United States 
reinsurance companies (Greenwald 38). 
Reinsurance executives do not expect the earthquake to have a 
major impaclt on reinsurance or the overall insurance industry. Spokesmen 
for the world's two largest reinsurers - Munich Reinsurance Company and 
Swiss Reinsurance Company - said early indications were that the 
earthquake was comparable to the 1989 San Francisco Bay area 
earthquake that did nearly $1 billion in insured damage. "The 
circumstances are very similar, the insurance density and other factors are 
the same," said a Munich Reinsurance spokesman (Greenwald 38). 
Bill Munson, president of reinsurer Mercantile and General Insurance 
Company of America in Morristown, New Jersey says, "From our own 
perspective, our own assessment, it will be less than what we experienced 
from the San Francisco earthquake and, overall, it's not going to be a huge 
problem for the industry. My guess is it's more of a psychological blow 
than a financial blow." SCOR Reinsurance Company won't know its losses 
for some time, said Jerome Karter, president and CEO of the New York 
firm (Greenwald 38). 
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Many reinsurance executives offered few specifics, but said the 
earthquake would be a minor loss for them. Paul T. Hasse, CEO of Centre 
Cat Ltd. in Bermuda, said that it's not likely to be a major event for them. 
Other reinsulrers did estimate their earthquake losses, which ranged from 
$1 million to $10 million. Global Capital Reinsurance Ltd. expects "no 
more than $10 million, if that," said Larry Doyle, CEO of the Bermuda 
catastrophe facility. NAC Reinsurance Corporation of Greenwich, 
Connecticut, foresees only "a few million dollars" in losses, said Paul 
Malvasio, vice president and chief financial officer. Right now, NAC 
Reinsurance Corporation has retrocessional coverage for losses in excess 
of $5 million, he said, so even if that estimate is wrong, "the most it should 
hit us is $5 million." At Transamerica Reinsurance Company, the loss is 
likely to be about $1 million, said Edwin M. Millette, president of the 
Stamford, Connecticut-based company. "It may in fact be less than that" 
(Greenwald 38). 
Several factors are expected to hold down reinsurer losses. Excess 
per-risk or pro rata reinsurance "will pick up a fair amount of this loss, 
especially on the commercial side," with the remainder being subject to 
catastrophe covers, said Frank Wilkinson, executive vice president for 
reinsurance intermediary E.W. Blanch Company in Minneapolis. For most 
primary insurers, the loss will be less than their contractual retention under 
catastrophe coverages, so the insurers will have to absorb the losses on a 
net basis, said Mr. Wilkinson (Greenwald 38). 
Higher primary retentions also will hold down reinsurer losses. "The 
impact to reinsurers will be negated by the higher retentions by the ceding 
companies, and the deductibles in California are quite substantial," said 
James Bryce, senior vice president of underwriting for International 
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Property Catastrophe Reinsurance Company Ltd. of Bermuda. "It's a 
small, small net loss" to the London market, predicted Michael Harris, 
underwriter f()r Lloyd's of London syndicate 952, which specializes in high-
level catastrophe excess of loss reinsurance. He also said that much of 
the catastrophe reinsurance left the London market during January 1 
renewals and is now placed in the Bermuda market (Greenwald 38). 
Even though the earthquake was not expected to be a major 
insurance loss, it could increase demand for catastrophe coverage. 
"Psychologically, it's sort of going to make a number of us come to the 
conclusion that the frequency and severity of catastrophes seen in the last 
four to fi.ve Y1ears is probably more typical of what we're going to see in the 
future, as opposed to the frequency and severity of the last 15 years, II said 
Ajit Jain, president of the reinsurance division of Berkshire Hathaway 
Incorporated in Stamford, Connecticut (Greenwald 38). 
Primary insurers are looking for ways in which to deal with the recent 
string of catastrophes, especially the January earthquake. Four major 
carriers are asking for permission to raise their California homeowners' 
premiums bletween seven and 22 percent. The recent disasters, along 
with not having rate increases in several years, are the reasons for the 
request. The increases require the approval of Insurance Commissioner 
John Garamendi, who said the companies will have to prove the need for 
the higher premiums ("Four" 9). 
The companies include California's largest property/casualty insurer, 
State Farm, which seeks an 8.3 percent hike. Also asking for increases 
are Century National, 7 percent; 20th Century Insurance, 21.8 percent; and 
Prudential, R9 percent. Allstate Insurance Company, which sought a 9.9 
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percent rate hike, already received permission to raise premiums by 6.8 
percent ("Four" 9). 
State Farm said the everyday cost of doing business and paying 
claims is as much to blame for the increase requests as the disasters that 
have plagued California in recent years. The company, which has more 
than one-fourth of the market with 1.43 million policies in 1993, anticipates 
a $50 million annual loss by 1995 in homeowners' underwriting, according 
to Marcia Larson, a spokesperson for State Farm. State Farm has also 
informed its 2,100 California agents not to write new homeowners policies, 
unless they lose existing policyholders ("Four" 9). 
The VVoodland Hills, California-based 20th Century, said it sought a 
21.8 percent hike because it has not had an increase in homeowners' 
premiums in 12 years, but has paid out sharply higher settlements. 
Ironically, Los Angeles, California-based Farmers Insurance Group 
received pel"mission to lower homeowners' rates by about 2.5 percent 
("Four" 9). 
One consumer representative, Philip Roberto of the nonprofit 
organization Proposition 103 Enforcement Project, believes insurers are 
flooding the iinsurance department with premium-increase requests, hoping 
that some may slip through without full hearings. Under California law, the 
increases go into effect automatically unless they have hearings in six 
months. The department, however, said only four of the state's 30 largest 
carriers have sought hikes ("Four" 9). 
Responding to the potential for a severe catastrophic event is 
something the property/casualty industry is trying to prepare for. Yet, 
according to H. Felix Kloman, vice president of Tellinghast, the industry is 
incapable of responding realistically to the forecasted economic effects of 
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catastrophes. He notes the industry has failed to use sophisticated risk 
assessment skills. Also, he argues that the industry is inadequately 
capitalized to meet the problem of the higher frequency and severity of 
catastrophes. "Two major events totaling $50 billion to $75 billion could 
effectively cripple the U.S. market, which accounts for 42 percent of world 
premiums," Kloman warned (Howard 37). 
There are ways in which the property/casualty insurers are devising 
to soften the effects of catastrophes on the industry and policyholders. The 
industry is working with government, regulators, and the public to 
implement innovative approaches to reduce catastrophes' physical and 
financial damage. A study by the New York-based Insurance Services 
Office identi'fies several methods which have considerable potential for 
helping insurers better deal with catastrophes. The first method is utilizing 
effective building codes. These involve grading local governments 
according to their compliance and level of enforcement with building code 
standards. Homes built according to good building code standards suffer 
less damage in major storms, according to ISO ("Impact" 23). 
Also, companies should look to geographic diversification. Applying 
new computer technology such as Geographic Information Systems could 
enable insurers to better monitor their geographic concentrations of 
business. Some insurers that were over concentrated in major storm-
prone areas have become insolvent, ISO notes ("Impact" 23). 
Improved ratemaking procedures is another method of coping with 
catastrophes. Using computer models that can link long-term natural 
disaster information with current demographic information to produce more 
accurate costs can contribute to better ratemaking. Current ratemaking 
procedures :;uffer from a lack of data on catastrophes - which are random 
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and relatively infrequent - and from the differences between current 
conditions and those conditions underlying the historical data ("Impact" 25). 
Catastrophe futures and options may be one way of dealing with 
catastrophes. Expanding use of these recently developed publicly traded 
financial vehicles would spread some of the risk of catastrophes beyond 
insurers and reinsurers to the wider capital markets. Catastrophe futures 
are not widelly used today because state regulators do not recognize them 
as a hedge, as opposed to an investment. As a hedge, futures can be 
used, lik.e reinsurance, to offset unexpectedly large losses and improve the 
insurer's balance sheet ("Impact" 22). 
Robert Mirabile, vice president of facultative reinsurance at New 
York-based North American Reinsurance Company, emphasizes the 
importance of knowing where these catastrophes are likely to occur and 
what the damage is likely to be. "It seems clear that estimates of storm 
loss potentials can no longer be based on ceded premiums by state, for 
example, because it is necessary to know where the risks are along paths 
of vulnerable exposure." Mirabile also states that while earthquake 
damages am hard to estimate, the industry has made a significant effort of 
planning for a major earthquake event. 'What is needed are corrections to 
be made before the fact instead of in constrained circumstances," Mirabile 
suggested ("New" 25). 
Richard Polun, manager of the New York branch for North American 
Reinsurance Company, emphasizes the need for firm underwriting in light 
of the increased exposure and insufficient reserve capacity for 
catastrophes. He said that the underwriting function "no longer has the 
lUxury of being in a world by itself. While the impression may be that 
underwriters have no control over the business they conduct, it has to be 
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understood that it may be very difficult at times to remain clear-minded 
because the deregulating atmosphere of the past several years has 
produced a confusion about basics and an undue reliance upon the 
financial power of investment." Polun outlines several ways in which the 
underwriters are able to do their best under these circumstances. First, 
maintain submission standards and consistency in analyzing and rating 
risks. Second, know as best as one can the difference between a fair rate, 
a going rate, and a walk-away rate. Third, keep an ongoing sense of the 
quality of risks and the demands on rates made by individual producers, as 
well as the experience of the producers' accounts. Another factor 
underwriters must consider is deciding at what price a risk should be 
declined because the going rate is inadequate. Polun says that if volume 
goals are under pressure or that the combined loss ratio is not to be 
protected, it can become impossible for underwriters to make relevant 
judgments about risks (Jennings 24). 
Recommendations by industry experts on what insurers must do to 
cope with catastrophes remain somewhat the same. Ramani Ayer, former 
chairman of the Insurance Services Office and president and chief 
operating officer of ITT/Hartford Group Inc., says that insurance 
companies, and the rest of society, are much too content to wait for a 
disaster to happen, rather than give serious consideration to how they will 
cope with the consequences. He also warns that the status quo is 
unacceptable and staying the same will only result in huge losses. Ayer 
suggests that insurers build strong, principled underwriting programs for 
areas subject to windstorms or earthquakes, taking into account 
calculation of maximum probable loss. Also, insurers should grade the 
risks they cover on municipal building codes and their enforcement and 
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provide incentives to homeowners to upgrade their structures and improve 
their storm worthiness. He also recommends that reinsurers work more 
closely with insurers and more carefully assess their catastrophic 
exposures. Ayer warns reinsurers that choose to write in catastrophe-
prone areas to spread their risks (Souter 13). 
Ayer also believes that state governments should allow realistic rates 
for risks in catastrophe areas. He notes that people who build their homes 
and live "with one foot on the porch and the other in the water" should pay 
for that privilege. The same is true for those whose home "happens to be 
on an earthquake fault line." Policyholders who live in safer areas should 
not be expected to subsidize policyholders who live in riskier areas of the 
country, according to Ayer (Souter 13). 
Ayer also recommends that state authorities help alleviate the pain 
of disasters by establishing funds to supplement disaster reimbursements 
from insurers and federal funds. Additionally, state authorities should 
ensure that their emergency response facilities are in place and ready to 
respond at all times. Ayer believes the federal government plays a crucial 
role in preparing for disasters by providing funds for disaster assistance 
(Souter 13). 
The recent string of disasters has led insurers to wonder what their 
strategy for 1the future will be. They may also wonder what lies ahead for 
the industry and to what extent their coverages and rates could be 
affected. The huge losses of 1992 led to talk of firming rates, especially for 
reinsurers. Reinsurance pricing is expected to increase by as much as 
200 to 300 percent. Many in the industry believe that federal coverage 
should be given if losses are above the point at which the industry could 
cover them. Industry executives believe they have the right to ask for help 
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if the viability of the industry is in jeopardy because of a major catastrophic 
loss. If the industry is in serious trouble, then so is the public good 
(Christine 60). 
After the 1992 catastrophes, some insurers adopted a variety of 
policy form changes designed to provide additional incentives to control 
losses and encourage adequate insurance to value. These include: 
capping guaranteed replacement coverage at a fixed percent above the 
policy limits; charging a separate premium for guaranteed replacement 
coverage; restricting coverage for home additions to a small fraction of 
existing policy limits; raising deductibles; and imposing earthquake 
sublimits on property insurance policy endorsements ("Impact" 24). 
Insurers' realization that hurricane exposures and their potential 
destruction are much greater than previously thought, combined with a 
weakened fiinancial condition for many companies, has prompted the 
industry to withdraw from hurricane-exposed states to bring property 
exposures into line with their financial capacity. Many companies, 
especially those in Florida, have planned to cut their homeowners business 
by institutin9 premium quotas on agents, prohibiting new business, not 
renewing entire books of business, canceling producers' contracts and 
reduCing agent commissions. In addition to the ten companies declared 
insolvent because of Hurricane Andrew, two companies have left the state. 
No admitted company appears to have indicated a willingness to enter the 
Florida homeowners market. According to A.M. Best Company, these 
business cutbacks could leave more than 500,000 homeowners without 
insurance provided by the voluntary admitted market, representing five to 
ten percent of the total (Snyder 23). 
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After Hurricane Andrew, insolvent companies owed $400 million in 
unpaid claims for 15,000 policyholders. The two percent annual premium 
tax for the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA), generating 
about $70 million each year, was insufficient to cover these unpaid claims. 
The legislature authorized up to $500 million in bonds. After the bonds 
were issued in February 1993, FIGA paid about $430 million in claims 
through June 1993. The bonds are to be repaid by an additional insurer 
assessment of two percent of premiums per year for the next ten years 
("Impact" 15). 
Louisiana also needed assistance with insolvencies and unpaid 
claims. A ruling by the attorney general in August 1993 allowed the State 
Bond Commission to approve a $130 million bond issue, so the Louisiana 
Insurance Guaranty Association (LlGA) could continue paying claims for 
insurers that failed after Hurricane Andrew. LlGA's funds would have run 
out in November without the bond issue ("Impact" 15). 
In Hawaii, homeowners insurance availability is also a problem. 
Since Hurricane Iniki struck, two companies have withdrawn from the 
market, one has become insolvent, and another is offering a policy only on 
new and renewal business that excludes wind loss due to hurricane. As in 
Florida, no admitted insurers have entered the Hawaiian market, and 
company withdrawals could leave 80,000 homeowners without insurance. 
Although these numbers are much smaller than those of Florida, they 
represent 3!i percent to 40 percent of the Hawaiian homeowners market 
(Snyder 23). 
To prevent a shortage of homeowners insurance that could leave 
thousands of homeowners without coverage, several state and federal 
solutions have been implemented or proposed. Florida has taken three 
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major steps to lessen potential homeowners availability problems. First, it 
created the Permanent Homeowner Joint Underwriting Authority. This 
facility operates with eight servicing carriers that issue basic homeowners 
policies providing coverage of up to $500,000 at a cost of 25 percent 
above the average voluntary market rate. The servicing carriers perform 
all undefWriting and claims functions for a fixed commission, but PHJUA is 
the risk··bearing entity and will generate either a profit or loss. The 25 
percent higher-than-average premium is meant to discourage use of the 
facility and enable greater profit potential. Losses generated by the facility 
will be offset: by assessments on the companies based on market share. 
These assessments would be unlimited, except for those companies 
writing less than $20 million in coverage (Snyder 23). 
Second, Florida expanded the eligibility for its coastal wind-loss pool, 
known as the Wind Storm Association, to all counties in the state. 
Previously, WSA provided wind-loss insurance in parts of 25 highly 
exposed coastal counties that were deemed uninsurable by the industry 
because of the threat of hurricanes (Snyder 23). 
Finally, Florida is aggressively preventing insurance companies from 
engaging in redlining, a form of illegal underwriting discrimination. The 
insurance department investigated several complaints that certain insurers 
had ceased offering insurance in coastal areas of southern Florida. In 
addition, aglent groups banded together to contest the underwriting 
restrictions certain companies had implemented in the state. The 
insurance department can revoke an insurerts license and/or impose fines 
if a company engages in this illegal activity (Snyder 23). 
Meanwhile, California Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi is 
making sure that policyholders with earthquake damage get full contract 
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value on their policies following the January earthquake. The policyholder 
protection effort will involve an intensive consumer education campaign, 
including media ads and a hot line, to inform them of what their rights are. 
Garamendi recommends that policyholders with earthquake damage file 
their claims immediately and pursue all their options. If pOlicyholders don't 
have earthquake insurance, they might receive coverage through other 
kinds of property insurance. Garamendi's second concern is to carefully 
monitor insurance companies, as well as monitoring policyholder 
complaints and carrying on investigations. The department will be policing 
the industry and intervening when problems arise. The last concern for 
Garamendi is to punish those companies that resist paying for losses 
sustained by deserving policyholders. Garamendi also believes that 
because earthquake insurance is too expensive for most consumers, the 
federal government must establish a natural disaster insurance program. 
A Natural Disaster Protection Act, which would create a federal 
catastrophe reinsurance facility, is currently being considered in the White 
House ("Garamendi" 38). 
In conclusion, the impact of catastrophes on property insurance 
continues to be of growing concern for both insurers and policyholders. 
1992 proved to be the most devastating in terms of catastrophic losses. 
Hurricane Andrew was the worst of a string of disasters in that year. 
Already, 19£14 is shaping up to be one of the worst years, if not the worst 
year, for catastrophic losses. California has endured its fair share of 
catastrophes in the past five years, including the San Francisco 
earthquake, the Los Angeles riots, the Oakland fires, the Southern 
California brush fires, and the most recent Los Angeles earthquake. The 
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January earthquake damages are being estimated and reestimated as we 
speak. 
Reinsurance has an extremely important role in helping primary 
insurers to dleal with catastrophes. Although the availability and terms of 
reinsurance have been constrained, reinsurers seem to be faring better 
than primary insurers. Insurers are learning to cope with catastrophes by 
imposing strjcter policy terms, by geographically diversifying their writings, 
and by spreading their risks. Insurers are also concentrating on becoming 
more aware of the possible frequency and severity of catastrophes. 
The future of the property/casualty insurance industry is one of 
uncertainty. The devastating catastrophe losses are leading to problems 
for insurers and policyholders alike. If the frequency and severity of these 
catastrophes continue at the current pace, as they are predicted to, higher 
rates and le:ss coverage could be in store for homeowners. While some 
insurers can handle such losses, some will be unable to pay claims or will 
become insolvent. Finally, government intervention on the federal and 
state levels may be the answer to coping with the large losses by providing 
disaster recovery and establishing guaranty funds. However the losses 
are shifted, the costs associated with catastrophes will ultimately be shared 
by both insurers and homeowners. 
..-
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